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Abstract 
Using a statistical methodology guided only by data and based on a genetic algorithm, 
we select the best econometric model for explaining the determinants of the size of the 
shadow economy, its main determinants being: taxes on capital gains of individuals, 
corporate taxes on income, profits and capital gains, domestic credit, bank secrecy, 
ethnic fractionalization, urban population, globalization, corruption and the socialist 
legal origin of country.  
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I. Introduction 
The determinants of the shadow economy remain controversial (see Schneider and 
Enste, 2000, for a survey).  
 
Using the massive database gathered by Thiessen (2010), the main contribution of our 
paper consists of selecting the determinants of the size of the shadow economy from a 
set of 274 variables suggested in the theoretical and empirical literature as potential 
causes and influences. We employ a purely statistical methodology which automatically 
selects the factors in the econometric model in a process guided only by data. Our 
methodology properly handles multicollinearity problems in the estimations that could 
arise due to the redundancy of the information provided by the factors. Besides, it offers 
a parsimonious model of the shadow economy, containing few factors with as much 
information as possible that captures the essential characteristics of the data, and can 
help in identifying the main reasons explaining its size.  
 
II. Methodology 
In order to avoid data mining problems for constructing the best econometric model 
explaining the empirical determinants of the size of the shadow economy, we follow the 
general to specific approach based on the theory of reduction (Hendry, 1995). It means 
that given an endogenous variable Y, which represents the indicator of the shadow 
economy, and a set 1,...., KX X  of 274 potential factors explaining it, the problem that 
we face is finding the best sub-model of the form: 
10 1
....
ki k i
Y X Xβ β β ε= + + + + ,  
where { } { }1 2, ...., 1, 2,..., ,ki i i K k K⊆ ≤ , being k the number of factors in the model, 
excluding the intercept. 
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The problem is that the number of sub-models where the criteria developed by 
econometric theory for selecting the best model is 2K . So, for 274K = , the number of 
possible models is higher than 13510 . In order to resolve this intractable problem, we 
follow the heuristic strategy proposed by Hoover and Perez (1999) by searching all the 
feasible reduction paths when simplifying the general model. In particular, we use the 
methodology developed in Acosta-González and Fernández-Rodríguez (2007). This is a 
procedure for automatic selection of factors in the model, guided only by the data, 
which is carried out using a Genetic Algorithm where the lost function is the Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC, henceforth). This methodology avoids the tendency to over-
identify models detected in several popular heuristic methods for selecting models [like 
stepwise, Lovell (1983)] and, by allowing all possible combinations of potential 
determinants, renders results that are robust to any specification. 
 
Therefore, starting with a large number of pot ntial causes and an indicator of the 
shadow economy considered in the literature to take into account all the information 
about its possible determinants, our methodology selects the best econometric model, in 
the sense of the SIC.  
 
The SIC advises choosing the econometric model which minimizes the expression 
2 1ˆlog log( )
k
SIC c N
N
σ
+
= +                                                (1) 
 
where 2
'
ˆ
e e
N
σ =  is the variance of the residuals e , N is the sample size, and k is the 
number of factors in the model, excluding the intercept. The correcting factor c  avoids 
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the possibility of over-parameterized models and solves the trade-off between the in 
sample goodness of fit and the out of sample forecasting ability. The higher the value of 
c , the higher the penalty for the introduction of more factors in the model.  
 
III. Data and empirical results 
We use the database gathered by Thiessen (2010) for 38 countries for the period 1991-
2007
1
. Given the high amount of missing data present in the Thiessen’s database, in 
order to produce a data matrix without missing values, we have employed a careful case 
wise deletion procedure, guided by our genetic algorithm, to eliminate the missing 
observations and variables. From the initial set of 646 observations [17 years times 38 
countries], the model was finally estimated with 371 observations. 
 
Regarding the indicator of the size of the shadow economy, we use money cash holding 
relative to M2. As for the explanatory variables, the database includes 294 potential 
determinants of the shadow economy covering such categories as constitutional system, 
tax and social security burden, administrative burden, quality of administration and 
justice system, economic institutions, values and moral aspects, and other influences 
and subjective factors (such as globalization, income inequality, ageing, etc.)
 2
. 
 
Table 1 reports the results provided by our genetic algorithm in order to search for the 
best set of variables explaining the shadow economy. As can be seen, we obtain a 
                                                
1
 We have data on 30 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States) 
and 8 Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia). 
2
 See Thiessen (2010, Appendix 1) for a detailed account of the variables included in 
each of these seven major groups of potential determinants. 
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negative and significant association between the shadow economy and taxes on capital 
gains of individuals, indicating that informality is a form of tax evasion. This is in line 
with previous theoretical and empirical analyses (e.g. Constantinides 1982, Stiglitz 
1983, Poterba 1987, OECD, 2006) that have suggested that there exist considerable 
opportunities for avoiding tax and for generating capital losses to offset ordinary 
income (especially for higher incomes), being therefore a substitute for the shadow 
economy as a means of evading taxes. 
 
We find a significant positive association between the shadow economy and taxes on 
income, profits and capital gains (as a percentage of GDP), suggesting that these have a 
negative impact on the decisions made by economic agents on whether to operate 
officially, driving entrepreneurs and businesses underground
 3
.  
 
The results of the regressions in Table 1 show that domestic credit (as a percentage of 
GDP) significantly influences the size of the hidden economy. This is consistent with 
the fact that although domestic credit is positively and significantly correlated with 
business and entry density rates, due to burdensome regulations, high marginal tax rates, 
the absence of monitoring and compliance (of both registration and tax regulations), and 
other weaknesses in the business environment, many firms might find it optimal to 
evade regulations and operate in the informal sector (Klapper et al., 2008). 
 
A strongly significant negative influence is also shown with regard to the bank secrecy 
dummy (1 = bank secrecy law is relatively effective; 0 = no bank secrecy law or not 
effective). This may indicate that bank secrecy would be a substitute for shadow 
                                                
3
 See Friedman et al. (2000) for a simple model of an entrepreneur’s decision to operate 
officially or unofficially depending on corporate taxes 
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economy by facilitating illicit financial flows worldwide for money laundering. Indeed, 
the world’s biggest players in the supply of financial secrecy are rich nations (see, 
Walker and Unger, 2009). 
 
The ethnic fractionalization index shows a significant negative influence on the size of 
the informal economy, in line with Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), who document 
that a high degree of ethnic fractionalization has negative effects on investment and 
increases rent seeking activities. 
 
With regard to urban population, our result is consistent with that of Elgin and Oyvaty 
(2013), who argue that although the share of the informal sector grows in the early 
phases of urbanizaton due to several pull and push factors (see. Smith, and Scarpaci, 
2010), it tends to decrease in the latter phases of urbanization. 
  
Concerning globalization, increasing competition in goods and factor markets raises 
uncertainty of income and employment, increasing the size of the shadow economy 
(Karlinger, 2009). Moreover the development of the networking-based economy has 
given birth to a large group of shadow enterprises, making the concept of national 
boundaries and distance for certain economic activities meaningless (Shangquan, 2000). 
 
In relation to corruption, our finding supports the view that corruption and the shadow 
economy are complements in high income countries and thus, a substitute for the 
official economy as suggested by Johnson et al. (1997) and Hindriks et al. (1999)
 4
. 
 
                                                
4
 To facilitate the interpretation, we have multiplied the original variable in Thiessen’s 
database by -1, so a higher value of this variable indicates greater corruption. 
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Finally, we detect a significant and positive influence for a dummy indicating that the 
legal origin of the country is socialist, suggesting that the legacy of high degree of 
bureaucratic discretion; undeveloped market institutions and enforcement mechanisms, 
and low degree of economic liberalization would have adversely influenced formal 
activity (Eilat and Zinnes, 2002). 
 
Turning to the goodness of fit, the value of the R-squared statistic reported in Table 1 
suggests the relative success of our regression model in predicting the shadow economy 
within the sample. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
IV.Conclussion 
We have empirically examined the determinants of the size of the shadow economy 
using a statistical methodology guided only by data and based on a genetic algorithm. 
We find a positive influence for corporate taxes, domestic credit, socialist legal origin of 
the country and corruption, as well as a negative influence for taxes on capital gains, 
bank secrecy, ethnic fractionalization, urbanization and globalization. 
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TABLE 1. Estimation results for a correcting factor c=2 in the Schwarz Information Criterion 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 184.2410 22.7739 8.0900 0.0000 
Taxes on capital gains of 
individuals (% of GDP) 
-129.9080 10.6907 -12.1515 0.0000 
Corporate taxes on income, 
profit & c.g. (% of GDP) 
8.2846 1.4892 5.5631 0.0000 
Domestic credit (% of GDP) 1.1084 0.0352 31.5224 0.0000 
Bank secrecy dummy) -39.3740 5.4486 -7.2264 0.0000 
Ethnic fractionalization Index -174.5049 21.6672 -8.0539 0.0000 
Urban population (% of total) -1.9017 0.2645 -7.1890 0.0000 
Globalization index -1.1254 0.2939 -3.8294 0.0002 
Corruption 8.3117 2.0670 4.0206 0.0001 
Legal origin of country, 
Socialistic 
38.4636 8.4153 4.5707 0.0000 
R-squared 0.8119     F-statistic 173.1621 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8073     Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
Standard Error of regression 39.5097     Schwarz criterion 24.1386 
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